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FEDERAL TAXATION: DEDUCTION DENIED UNDER
SECTION 212 (2) OF INTERNAL REVENUE CODE FOR
LEGAL EXPENSES INCURRED TO RETAIN OWNERSHIP
OF INCOME-PRODUCING PROPERTY
IN the recent cases of United States v. Patrick,1 and United States v.
Gilmore,2 the Supreme Court held that payments to an attorney in
connection with divorce proceedings were not deductible expenses,
even though the payments in question were made primarily to retain
control of income-producing property.
In the Patrick case, respondent incurred $19,200 in legal ex-
penses3 to effect a property settlement agreement in an uncontested
divorce action. The agreement provided for transfer of stock,
leasing of property, and creation of a trust, in order to permit
respondent to maintain control of a family corporate publishing
business. The District Court for the Western District of South
Carolina held that the expenses were deductible under section 212 (2)
of the Internal Revenue Code,4 and the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment.5 In the Gilmore case, re-
spondent .paid attorney's fees of $32,500 to protect his controlling
stock interest in an atuomobile dealership against community prop-
erty claims asserted by his wife in her action for divorce.0 These
expenses were likewise held to be deductible by the Court of
372 U.S. 53 (1963).
2372 U.S. 39 (1963).
'About 50% of this amount was paid by respondent to the wife's attorneys. The
Government contended that, in any event, fees paid to the wife's attorneys were non-
deductible under previous decisions of the Court. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 370
U.S. 65 (1962); Magruder v. Supplee, 316 U.S. 394 (1942).
'186 F. Supp. 48 (W.D.S.C. 1960). The INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §212, provides
that "in the case of an individual, there shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary
and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year . . . (2) for the
management, conservation, or maintenance of property held for the production of
income ......
The taxable years in question are governed by both the 1939 and 1954 Codes.
Since the relevant portions of these Codes are substantially identical, for the sake of
clarity reference will be made only to the 1954 Code.
r288 F.2d 292 (4th Cir. 1961).
2 The wife contended that the earnings retained by respondent's corporations during
their marriage were the product of his personal services, and not the result of accretion
in capital values, thus rendering his stockholdings pro tanto community property
under California law. 290 F.2d 942, 944 (Ct. Cl. 1961). See Lenninger v. Lenninger,
167 Cal. 297, 139 Pac. 679 (1914); Pereira v. Pereira, 156 Cal. 1, 103 Pac. 488 (1909).
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Claims.7 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in both cases" be-
cause of a conflict of views among the lower federal courts and the
continuing importance of the question in the administration of
federal income tax laws.
Originally, the only general provision authorizing the deduction
of the expenses of income-producing activities was the forerunner
of the present section 162 (a), which allowed deduction of expenses
incurred in carrying on "any trade or business." Giving that pro-
vision a narrow construction, the Supreme Court held, in Higgins
v. Commissioner,0 that the activities of an individual in overseeing
his extensive investments in stocks and bonds did not constitute a
"trade or business" in the statutory sense and, hence, his expenses
were not deductible.
In the Revenue Act of 1942,"1 Congress responded to the in-
equity inherent in denying a deduction for the expenses of income-
producing activities while taxing the profits from such activities.
The requirement of a technical "trade or business" was removed
from the 1939 Code and it was provided that an individual might
deduct all the ordinary and necessary expenses incurred "for the
management, conservation, or maintenance of property held for
the production of income."' 2 Section 212 (2) of the present code
contains a substantially identical provision.
Two divergent lines of authority developed regarding the test to
be used in determining the applicability of the new provision. In
Lykes v. United Statesa 3 the Supreme Court held that legal expenses
incurred in contesting the assessment of a gift tax liability were not
deductible, even though property held for the production of income
would have to be liquidated in order to pay the deficiency. Noting
that the deductibility of attorney's fees "turns wholly upon the
nature of the activities to which they relate,"' the Court denied the
deduction because the gifts which gave rise to the Commissioner's
1290 F.2d 942 (Ct. C1. 1961).
8 United States v. Patrick, 368 U.S. 817 (1961); United States v. Gilmore, 368 U.S. 816
(1961).
0 INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, ch. 1, §23, 53 Stat. 12 (now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§ 162 (a)).
10312 U.S. 212 (1941).
11 Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 121, 56 Stat. 798.
'
2 INT. RFV. CODE OF 1939, § 23(a) (2), added by ch. 619, § 121, 56 Stat. 798 (1942).
13 343 U.S. 118 (1952).
2 id. at 123.
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claim were "personal" rather than income-producing transactions.Y
Shortly thereafter, in Baer v. Commissioner,' the Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit allowed the deduction of legal fees incurred
to effect an alimony settlement whereby the husband retained con-
trolling stock interest in a corporation. Since the business furnished
the husband's principal source of livelihood, the court reasoned that
the cost of preserving his interest was an expense of "conserving and
maintaining" his income-producing property.
The Baer approach has been followed, in dictum or in holding,
by the Court of Claims and the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits.17
In sharp conflict stands the decision of the Second Circuit in Lewis
v. Commissioner."' In Lewis, the court, having concluded that the
Baer decision was irreconcilable with Lykes, expressly refused to
follow it and held that the taxpayer's expenses of negotiating a
marital property settlement were nondeductible although incurred
to retain ownership of the stock of three wholly-owned corporations.
In the present cases, respondents, relying on Baer, claimed de-
ductions under section 212 (2) because the legal fees in question were
not incurred to contest their liability, but were allegedly expended
to "conserve" the stockholdings upon which their jobs depended.
In denying the deductions, the majority, in two opinions by Mr.
'25 Expenses of contesting tax liabilities-the fact situation directly involved in
Lykes-are now deductible under § 212 (3) of the 1954 Code. That provision, new to
the 1954 Code, reflects simply a policy judgment, of obvious appeal, that the expenses
of litigating with one's government over tax liabilities ought to be deductible notwith-
standing their "personal" character, and is of a piece with, for example, the deduction
allowed for extraordinary medical expenses. It in no way detracts from the basic
holding of the Lykes case that, for purposes of determining deductibility as a "business"
expense, the source of the liability rather than the nature of the assets threatened is
determinative.
"' 196 F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 1952).
17 In addition to the holdings in the Gilmore case from the Court of Claims and
its companion, the Patrick case from the Fourth Circuit, see Owens v. Commissioner,
273 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1959); Bowers v. Commissioner, 243 F.2d 904 (6th Cir. 1957);
McMurty v. United States, 132 F. Supp. 114 (Ct. Cl. 1955). For dictum distinguishing
Baer but apparently approving its holding, see Harris v. United States, 275 F.2d 288
(9th Cir. 1960); Tressler v. Commissioner, 228 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1955); Howard v.
Commissioner, 202 F.2d 28 (9th Cir. 1953). See also Davis v. United States, 287 F.2d
168 (Ct. Cl. 1961), rev'd on other grounds, 370 U.S. 65 (1962). The cases following
Baer have allowed deduction of legal expenses only where the wife's claims, if successful,
might have destroyed the husband's capacity to earn a living, through loss of controlling
interest in his business. No deduction has been allowed where only diversified securi-
ties of the husband have been threatened. There is no support for this distinction in
§ 212 (2), since diversified securities are no less "property held for production of income"
than a large stock in a single company.
18 253 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1958).
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Justice Harlan,' held that the origin and character of the claim with
respect to which an expense was incurred, rather than its potential
consequences upon the fortunes of the taxpayer, is the controlling
test of whether an expense is deductible. Since the claims asserted
by the wives in the divorce actions arose from respondents' marital
relationships and not from profit-seeking activities, legal expenses
incurred for the purpose of discharging such claims were non-
deductible "personal" expenditures.20
The test adopted by the Court finds support in a literal reading
of section 212 (2). In context, "conservation of property" appears to
refer to operations performed with respect to the res itself, rather
than to a taxpayer's retention of ownership in the property.21
The legislative history of the section further supports the Court's
conclusion. The committee reports make clear that the sole purpose
of the 1942 amendment was to remove the requirement that ex-
penses be incurred in a technical "trade or business" in order to be
deductible. 22  Consequently, deductions under section 212 (2) are
still subject to the other restrictions which apply in the case of
business expense deductions.23 Foremost among these restrictions
10 872 U.S. 39 & 53 (1963).
20 INT. REv. ConE oF 1954, § 262, provides, with certain minor exceptions, that: "[N]o
deduction shall be allowed for personal, living, or family expenses." Consequently,
expenses of divorce litigation, being "personal" expenses, have generally been held to be
nondeductible.
The present Treasury regulation, Treas. Reg. § 1-262-1 (b) (7) (1952), provides:
"Generally, attorney's fees and other costs paid in connection with a divorce, separa-
tion or decree for support are not deductible by either the husband or the wife.
However, the part of an attorney's fee and the part of the other 'costs paid in con-
nection with a divorce, legal separation, written separation agreement, or a decree for
support, which are properly attributable to the production or collection of amounts
includible in gross income under section 61 are deductible by the wife under section
212."
The "Generally" qualification was added specifically to allow for the single stated
exception (the "However" sentence) and not otherwise to qualify the disallowance of
such expenses. T.D. 5889, 1952-1 CuMr. BuLL. 31.
-"As customarily defined, "conservation" implies a physical safeguarding of the
thing, or prevention of change in its state. See Hermann F. Ruoff, 30 T.C. 204 (1958).
It is in this sense that "conservation" is used in § 212 (2) to make deductible the cost
of a watchman to guard rental property or the fee paid for a safe-deposit box in which
to keep securities. See Daniel S. W. Kelly, 23 T.C. 682 (1955). To use "conservation"
as including also the avoidance of the need to sell an interest in the thing to satisfy a
liability constitutes a rather strained usage.
21 H.R. R-a. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 75 (1942). See also S. REP. No. 1631,
77th Cong., 2d Sess. 88 (1942).
23 Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner, 325 U.S. 365 (1945); McDonald v. Commis-
sioner, 323 U.S. 57 (1944).
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is the requirement that the expense originate in the income-
producing activity.24
Aside from history and authority, strong policy grounds justify
making the deductibility of legal expenses turn upon the origin or
source of the claim, rather than upon the nature of the assets threat-
ened by the claim. If the latter alternative were adopted, capricious
and irrational results might follow. For example, the expenses of
defending even a personal tort claim would be deductible by a tax-
payer on the ground that such defense was made to protect whatever
income-producing property he might own. In such a case, the de-
duction would bear no causal conection with the basis of the suit or
the reasons for defending it.25 Moreover, substantial inequities
would inhere by allowing one taxpayer to deduct litigation costs
merely because his portfolio contains income-producing property and
denying the deduction to another because his capital happens to be
invested in a home.26
The majority's decision represents a logical corollary of the Lykes
case, and is entirely consistent with the purposes of section 212 (2).
In effect, the Baer case has been overruled and an explicit test laid
down for the lower federal courts to follow. In the future, indi-
vidual taxpayers attempting to deduct legal fees can expect courts
to closely scrutinize the origin or source of the claim involved. Ex-
penses incurred in marital or other personal settlements will clearly
be nondeductible under section 212 (2), although such expenditures
might be partially recoverable through utilization of other pro-
visions. For example, the part of the legal fees which can be allo-
cated for tax advice might be deductible under section 212 (3).27 On
21 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162 (a), provides solely for the deduction of expenses
"'incurred ... in carrying on any trade or business ...."
2r To the extent that a taxpayer incurs involuntary expenses, such as a tort liability,
his ability to pay an income tax is impaired. Consequently, there is substantial reason
for allowing the deduction of such expenses in the same manner that analogous casualty
losses are deductible under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 165 (c) (3). However, this would
require a specific provision by Congress, since § 212 (2) clearly does not allow such a
deduction.
21 Making deductibility of defense costs turn upon the form of investment at the
time of the suit would mean that a home-owning defendant could become entitled to
deduct the costs of defending a tort action by mortgaging his home and investing
the proceeds in securities. The nonsense of a rule turning upon such irrelevancies is
evident.2 7 Irr. Rv. CODE OF 1954, § 212(3), allows a deduction for the "ordinary and
necessary expenses paid . . . in connection with the determinaiion, collection, or refund
of any tax." The deduction apparently encompasses only the expenses of the actual
taxpayer. Consequently, in United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962), the Supreme
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the other hand, the expenses of resisting the wife's contentions as to
the existence of specific community property in the Gilmore case
might be capitalized and added to the basis of the property as a cost
of defending respondent's title.28 Consequently, the Court's holding
should not be read as a complete denial of tax relief in Gilmore-
Patrick situations.
Court disallowed a husband's deduction of legal fees paid to his wife's attorney for tax
advice to the wife. The Court intimated no opinion as to the deductibility of the
legal expenses for tax advice incurred by the husband in the course of a divorce settle-
ment.
28 See Harris v. United States, 275 F.2d 238 (9th Cir. 1960); Shipp v. Commissioner,
217 F.2d 401 (9th Cir. 1954).
The legal expenses incurred for leasing arrangements in the Patrick case might be
capitalized and amortized over a period of years to the extent that the fees were for
services on behalf of respondent in his capacity as a lessor. See Commissioner v.
Chicago Dock & Canal Co., 84 F.2d 288 (7th Cir. 1936); Helvering v. Manhattan Life
Ins. Co., 71 F.2d 292 (2d Cir. 1934).
In both cases, a problem arises from the Court's labeling of the legal expenses as
"'personal" expenses. Such a classification might preclude capitalization of the ex-
penditures for tax purposes.
